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The impact of class size on student achievement remains a thorny question for educational 
decision makers. Meta-analyses of empirical studies emphasise the absence of class-size effects 
but detractors have argued against such pessimistic conclusions because many of the underlying 
studies have not paid attention to the endogeneity of class-size. This paper uses a stringent 
method to address the endogeneity problem using TIMSS data on 45 countries. We measure the 
class size effect by relating the difference in a student’s achievement across subjects to the 
difference in his/her class-size across subjects. This (subject-differenced) within-pupil 
achievement production function avoids the problem of the non-random matching of children to 
specific schools, and to classes within schools.  The results show a statistically significant effect 
of class size for 16 countries but in only 10 of them is the effect negative, and the effect size is 
very small in most cases. Several robustness tests are carried out, including control for students’ 
subject-specific ability and subject-specific teacher characteristics, and correction for possible 
measurement error. Thus, our stringent approach to addressing the problem endogeneity confirms 
the findings of meta-analyses that find little support for class size effects. We find that class-size 
effects are smaller in resource-rich countries than in developing countries, supporting the idea 
that the adverse effect of larger classes increases with class-size. We also find that class size 
effects are smaller in regions with higher teacher quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing teacher inputs is popularly thought to be an effective way of increasing student 
learning and teachers are mostly in favour of smaller classes. However, reducing class size is 
usually an expensive policy.  In most developed countries, demographic changes have 
mechanically involved important reductions in class size. This evolution strongly contributes to 
the increase of the cost per pupil over a long period because teacher salaries consume the 
dominant share of recurring education expenses, estimated between 66% and more than 90% in 
OECD countries.  
The key empirical challenge in identifying class size effects arises due to the potential 
non-random matching of students to schools and, within schools, to particular classes. For 
instance, if higher ability students are systematically placed in the larger classes within their 
grade in the school, a positive coefficient for class size can appear in a standard estimate of the 
education production function but this would not represent a causal effect. In order to circumvent 
this kind of endogeneity bias two major approaches have been used in the literature. 
The first uses randomized experiments. The Project STAR (Student/Teacher Achievement 
Ratio) carried out in Tennessee in the mid-1980s is probably the most important study of this 
kind. Krueger (1999) found that the advantage of experimentally reducing class size were 
relatively small: a reduction of around 8 students per class raised test score by less than 0.02 
standard-deviations, making class size reduction a very costly way of achieving small learning 
gains. An important limitation of randomized trials is that participants may react to being in an 
experiment. Hoxby (2000) argues that teachers may exhibit behavioural change in an experiment 
because the outcome of the experiment has implications for the future funding of their schools. 
As Todd and Wolpin (2003) point out, experiment based studies have a very high cost and new 
experimental studies are necessary in order to check for the robustness of the results found in 
Project STAR. Other studies have tried the same kind of experiment and Kremer (2003) provides 
a synthesis of these analyses in developing countries. Yet other studies use other exogenous   3
variations in class-size given by ‘natural’ experiments. For instance, Hoxby (2000) uses the fact 
that large rivers make it difficult for parents to access schools. These natural restrictions make it 
possible to purge endogeneity bias in a rather intuitive way. However, truly natural ‘natural’ 
experiments are few (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000).   
Another approach to dealing with endogeneity bias is using valid instruments which 
induce exogenous variation in class size. If class size varies due to some exogenously given 
administrative rules (rather than due to student or school choices), the measurement of the class 
size effect can be free of endogeneity bias. The solution consists of seeking a variable correlated 
with class size but not otherwise correlated with pupil achievement. Angrist and Lavy (1999) 
exploit a rule of the Israeli school system whereby the mandated maximum class size is fixed at 
40 pupils. Consequently, when number of pupils in a grade increases from 40 to 41 pupils, the 
grade is split into two classes, with mean class size of 20.5, and the change in class size is not due 
to the non-random choice of pupils or school. Angrist and Lavy apply this principle and obtain a 
significant effect from a reduction in class size on student achievement. However, even when an 
exogenously given (e.g. government-mandated) maximum class-size rule exists in a developing 
country, it is rarely adhered to in practice.  Thus a discontinuity design of the type used by 
Angrist and Lavy may not yield valid instruments for class size in developing country contexts. 
Within the instrumental variables (IV) approach, Wößmann and West (2006) estimate the 
class size effect on the school performance for 11 countries by combining school fixed effects 
and the IV method, in order to identify the random variation of the class size between two 
consecutive grades inside the same school. They regress the change in performance of pupils 
between grades 7 and 8 on the change in class size between grades 7 and 8 in the same school. 
The authors combine school fixed effects and IV estimation to identify random class-size 
variation between two adjacent grades within individual schools. It should be noted that they do 
not use a pupil fixed effects approach but rather a school fixed effects technique. The authors show   4
that conventional estimates of class-size effects are strongly skewed by the non-random 
distribution of pupils into small and large class sizes in schools. The instruments used are the 
average number of pupils for each grade within the school. While Wößmann and West (2006) 
find large and significant effects coefficients for Greece and Iceland, they show small or no 
effects for the other 9 countries. 
In this paper, we examine the effect of class size on pupil achievement by using the 
traditional achievement production function, but the innovation is to allow for pupil fixed effects 
in cross section data. Across-subject rather than across-time differencing is used. This is possible 
because the TIMSS database provides a pupil’s score in several evaluated subjects for some 
countries (and in at least mathematics and science for all countries). This approach enables us to 
control all subject-invariant student and family unobservables. Our cross-section data make it 
possible to check if the class size in different subjects in a given year is correlated with the 
student's marks across those subjects within the grade in the school. In other words, we estimate a 
within-pupil across-subject equation of the achievement production function rather than a within-
pupil across-time one. The idea is exactly the same as in panel data estimates of the achievement 
production function but we will show below that our approach is superior to the panel data 
approach both methodologically and in terms of cost-effectiveness. Other studies have used this 
estimation technique in order to evaluate teacher gender effects on pupil achievement (Dee, 2005; 
Holmlund and Sund, 2005; Ammermüller and Dolton, 2007) and the effect of teacher 
characteristics on pupil achievement (Kingdon, 2006; Aslam and Kingdon, 2007). To our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to use this regression technique for examining the effect of class 
size on educational achievement. 
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2. Estimation technique 
The objective is to estimate an educational production function in a consistent manner. The 
standard achievement function is specified as follows:  
k i k ik ik S X A                            ( 1 )  
where the achievement level of student i in school k is determined by a vector of his/her personal 
characteristics (X) and by a vector of school and teacher characteristics (S).  i   captures all 
student level and  k   all school level unobservables. Typically in the literature, class size is 
included in the vector S, i.e. class size variables have a k subscript. However, we have data on 
student achievement and separately on class-size by subject for all students of grade 8 in the 
sample schools.  That is, for each student in grade 8, there are as many rows of data as there are 
number of subjects. Thus, there can be variation in class size for a student within the school since 
lessons for each subject are taught in different classes, and it is possible to include class size as an 
explanatory variable in its own right in a school fixed effects equation. With this approach it is 
also possible to include pupil fixed effects whereby the only variables retained in the achievement 
equation will be class size and teacher characteristics since it is only these that vary within pupil 
(across subject). This is the approach we follow. We estimate a simple pupil fixed effects 
equation of achievement: 
) ( jk jk ij k jk ik ijk S C X A                               (2) 
ijk A  is the achievement of student i in subject j in school k, X is a vector of characteristics of pupil 
i, C is the class size and teacher characteristics for subject j and S a vector of characteristics of 
school k. The composite error term is in brackets.  ij  ,  jk   and  jk   represent respectively the 
unobserved characteristics of the student, the subject class and the school. A pupil fixed effects 
model implies, for the simplified case of two subjects, 1 and 2: 
           1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 k k k k i i k k k i k i C C A A                           (3)   6
Pupil fixed effects implies within-school estimation since a student necessarily studies within a 
single school. If school unobservables are not subject specific (  does not have a j subscript) and 
if pupil unobservables are also not subject specific (  does not have a j subscript) then within 
school k, we have: 
     1 2 1 2 1 2         C C A A i i                  ( 4 )  
and regressing difference in a pupil's test scores across subjects on the difference in class size 
across subjects nets out the effect of all student unobserved characteristics. However, if student 
ability is subject-varying, it not netted out but   1 2 i i     remains in the error term. But its 
presence in the error term alone would not cause omitted variable bias unless it were correlated 
with   1 2 C C  . But for that to happen, students should be able to match to specific classes of a 
subject within their grade in the school (e.g. students who are bright in a subject systematically 
match to the smaller – or the larger – classes of that subject within their grade). In our approach, 
by construction this is ruled out since each subject row has the averaged class size of all classes 
of that subject in grade 8 in the school. Thus, the presence of subject-varying pupil ability is not a 
source of bias in our approach. However, subject-specific school  unobservables   1 2 k k     
remain in the error term and may in principle be correlated with   1 2 C C  . However such bias is 
unlikely to be important since subject varying aspects of school should be captured in class size, 
i.e. if a school emphasises a subject, it is often reflected in (or is because of) small class sizes in 
that subject and this is likely to show up in the subject specific class size effect. 
However, for consistent estimation of the class size effect, it is also required that class 
level unobserved characteristics be unrelated to the included class size variable: 
    0 1 2 1 2    C C E                     ( 5 )  
Since omitted class level variables in  1  ,  2   may be correlated both with class size  1 C  ,  2 C  and 
with student achievement  1 A ,  2 A , we cannot say that pupil fixed effects estimation of   7
achievement permits us to interpret the effects of class size as causal. While across-subject pupil 
fixed effects estimation solves one source of endogeneity (the correlation between   and C ), it 
does not solve the second potential source of endogeneity (the possible correlation between   
and  C ). This is analogous to the situation with standard panel data analysis where class 
unobservables remain in the error term.  
 
4. Data 
The estimation strategy presented above requires a specific database. Two conditions are 
necessary. First of all, it is necessary to have students’ achievement scores for different subjects. 
If we have only one subject for each pupil, it is not possible to use the pupil fixed effects 
estimator. Another condition is that there be reasonable variation in class size between subjects.  
A database that answers both these conditions is the TIMSS survey (Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study) which was carried out in 1995, 1999 and 2003. In 
our study, we use the data from TIMSS 2003. TIMSS was led by the IEA (International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) and constitutes the largest 
international survey of pupil achievement, encompassing approximately 50 countries, covering 
grades 4 and 8 of the educational cycle. Since the number of evaluated subjects varies only in 
grade 8, we chose this grade for our estimations. Each participating country administered the test 
with a representative sample of schools with grade 8 pupils. The tests are standardized by the IEA 
and the results are thus comparable across countries. The pupils were tested in mathematics and 
the sciences. According to the structure of the education systems, the number of science subjects 
varied from 2 to more than 8. Typically, there are two types of education systems: the ‘unified’ 
system where science in taught as a single subject in grade 8 and the ‘diversified’ system where 
the different sciences are taught as separate subjects. For example, we can differentiate England 
where only 2 scientific subjects are taught at grade 8 level (Mathematics and Science) and   8
Hungary where there are 5 various scientific subjects (Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Chemistry 
and Geography).  
Of the 45 countries taking part in TIMSS for pupils at grade 8, we retained 33 countries 
which met the two conditions mentioned above. For 8 countries, class size does not vary between 
the subjects (Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Syria, Taiwan). In some other 
countries, the variations in class size are too small. In general, when the class size difference 
between subjects is less than 10% apart – when averaged across the sample schools within a 
country - we do not retain that country. Four countries are in this situation (Saudi Arabia, Ghana, 
Japan, Norway). Finally we do not retain Morocco because data is lacking for a large number of 
schools and because the education system consists of two parts: an "integrated system" (where 
only one science matter is taught) and a "diversified system" (where several science subjects are 
taught). Although for some countries, more than 5 subjects are available, we do not have specific 
achievement scores in all the subjects. This is especially the case in countries of Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe for which 5 or 6 scientific subjects are taught. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. In graphs 1 to 4, we 
present the kernel densities of achievement mark by subject for 4 countries (Australia, US, 
Bulgaria and Egypt) as an illustration. It is clear that the distribution of achievement scores is not 
similar across subjects. For example, the science scores in Egypt are higher and less dispersed 
than scores in mathematics. In order to use the difference of achievement scores between subjects 
as the dependent variable, it is necessary to standardize the scores. We standardize the score in 
each subject by the average of the score in the subject in the country, i.e. we use the z-scores of 
achievement score. The z-score is the score of a pupil in a given subject minus the national 
average score in that subject, divided by the standard deviation of the national score on this 
subject. By construction then, the average of the standardized score in each subject is equal to 0   9
and its standard deviation is 1. The right parts of graphs 1 to 4 show that the distribution of 
standardized scores is more similar across subjects than the distribution of raw scores.  
 
5. Results 
We start by discussing the main results. Then, we perform various robustness tests and finally 
make a synthesis of the effects obtained. 
 
5.1. Overall results 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 1 to 7. In order to simplify the presentation, 
we divide the countries into three categories: (i) Developed Countries, (ii) Eastern European and 
Central Asian (EECA) countries and (iii) Developing Countries. Only the coefficients relating to 
the class size variable are presented. Details about the other included variables are given in the 
notes below each table. To avoid losing observations due to missing values of control variables, 
we use the dummy variable approach for missing values. This is likely to reduce biases due to 
omitted variables and also helps to avoid reducing the sample size. 
The estimates use pupils' results in all subjects tested in a country. We start with weighted 
least squares regression. Our estimations are thus weighted by students' sampling weights to 
ensure that the contribution of the students from each stratum in the sample to the parameter 
estimates is the same as would have been obtained in a complete census enumeration 
(DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983 ; Wooldridge, 2001). This method can only explain the 
differences between pupils across schools and carries the risk that coefficients are biased due to 
the correlation of class-size with students’ unobserved characteristics, such as ability. To correct 
such endogenity bias, we first re-estimate the WLS achievement equations on the reduced sample 
of only those classes which are not grouped by student ability (Table 2) and then attempt to 
address endogeneity by instrumenting class-size (not presented).  In Table 3 we present results   10
from School fixed effects estimation. Table 4 presents our preferred pupil fixed effects estimates 
of the achievement equation where identification of the class size effect comes only from across-
subject difference in class-size ‘within a pupil’. Since class-size varies sufficiently across subjects 
in only 33 countries, the pupil fixed effects estimates are confined to this sub-sample of countries. 
Tables 5 to 8 present some robustness tests and synthesis of results.  As we pool data across all 
subjects, a dummy variable for each subject is included in all the regressions. In addition, a series 
of pupil and school level variables are introduced as control variables (age, gender, speaks 
national language at home, number of books at home, possesses a computer, parents born in 
country, parents' highest education, city size and number of computers in the school). The last 
variable drops out of the school fixed effects equations and all these controls drop out of the pupil 
fixed effects equations. 
We start with WLS regressions in Table 1. The first column imposes the restriction that 
class-size has a linear relationship with achievement (class-size is entered linearly). In the second 
set of columns, we allow the class-size effect to be non-linear by introducing both the linear and 
quadratic terms of class-size. In the majority of linear estimates, class size seems to have a 
significant coefficient. For instance, it is statistically significant in 32 out of 45 countries.   
However, the sign of the class size coefficient differs across country groups. Looking at the first 
column, class size is mostly positively correlated with pupil achievement in developed countries: 
in 11 of the 14 countries in this group, there is a positive and significant class-size ‘effect’. For 
the United States, there is no significant effect. The size of the coefficient varies by country: the 
effects are strong for Hong-Kong and Netherlands (where a 1 SD increase in class size increases 
achievement score by 0.25 and 0.22 SD respectively), while they are rather weak for Italy and 
Taiwan. A positive class size effect can arise if better quality schools attract more students and 
thus have higher class size, or if schools group low ability students into smaller classes so that 
high ability students are in larger classes. The second set of columns show that the class size-   11
achievement relationship is non-linear in 10 out of the 14 developed countries – concave in 5 
countries (with an average turning point at 40 students per class) – and convex in others.   
The second group of countries (EECA) is analyzed next. Of the 13 countries included in 
this group, 5 have significant positive class-size coefficients (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova 
and Slovakia) and 4 have significant negative coefficients (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and 
Russian Federation). The size of the coefficients is very small, except for Hungary and Slovakia.  
The relationship is quadratic in 6 of the 13 countries. The last group of countries – namely 
developing countries – demonstrate a mostly negative relation between class size and student 
performance. The class-size coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 10 out of the 14 
countries for which there is a statistically significant class-size ‘effect’. Ghana, Indonesia, and 
Lebanon have a positive and significant class-size coefficient. Where the relationship is non-
linear, it is mostly convex i.e. achievement falls with higher class size but at a decreasing rate. 
Where the convexity has an upward sloping part, it occurs at very high levels of class-size (on 
average above 49 students per class, and only 8% of developing country classes have more than 
49 students per class). Thus, for most of the relevant range of class-sizes in developing countries, 
the relationship of class-size with achievement is negative.  
Thus it appears that, in general, the class size effect varies according to the economic level 
of the countries. While it is generally positive in the developed countries, it seems to be mostly 
negative in developing countries. The effect is mixed for the EECA countries. The fact that the 
correlation of class-size with pupil achievement across schools is generally negative in 
developing countries but not so elsewhere accords with the notion that class-size matters 
negatively when classes are large, since mean class-size is substantially larger in developing 
countries than in the EECA and developed countries, as seen in Appendix Table A2.  However, 
these are naïve WLS results and, as such suffer from potential endogeneity bias.   12
We try several different ways of reducing endogeneity bias.  Firstly, we can partly address 
endogeneity concerns by estimating achievement equations only for that subset of classes where 
students are not grouped by ability. The TIMSS survey asked schools whether students were 
grouped by ability within their maths classes and within their science classes. Appendix Table A3 
shows the proportion of maths and science classes that are grouped by ability in each country, 
and how sample size changes when we consider only students not grouped by ability. Table 2 
presents WLS results for the reduced sample of students not grouped by ability. In the developed 
country group, the result of removing the effect of student ability in this way is generally to cause 
the class-size effect (CSE) to become more negative.  Comparing column 1 in Tables 1 and 2, the 
CSE falls in 9 out of 13 countries, though rarely statistically significantly. In four of these 9 
(Australia, Italy, Sweden and USA) the coefficient turns from positive to negative; in the case of 
Sweden it turns from significant positive to significant negative and in the US it turns from 
insignificant positive to significant negative.  Changes are apparent in the quadratic specification 
as well, e.g. for England where the sign of the linear term turns negative. In both the EECA group 
and the developing country groups, the result of removing ability-set classes is more mixed and 
generally more inconsequential
1.   
A second way we attempted to address the endogeneity of class size, is by using 
Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation. The TIMSS survey asked teachers to what extent high 
student teacher ratio limited how they taught.  This is highly correlated with class size but 
perhaps should not otherwise be correlated to student achievement. If we believe in the 
instrument’s validity, this correction for endogeneity makes quite a lot of difference. Appendix 
A4 presents the results.  Whereas Table 1 showed that in the developed country group, the CSE 
was positive and significant in 10 out of the 14 countries, IV estimates show the CSE to be 
                                                 
1 The CSE falls in 4 and rises in 10 out of the 14 EECA countries, though never statistically significantly. In Latvia it 
changes from significant to insignificant positive, in Macedonia from significant to insignificant negative and in the 
Russian Federation from insignificant to significant negative. The CSE falls in 11 and rises in 6 out of the 17 
developing countries, but never significantly. In Malaysia and Tunisia, CSE turns negative, in Syria the significant 
negative CSE turns insignificant.   13
negative and significant in 5 of these 14 countries. In Belgium, New Zealand and Taiwan the 
significant positive CSE turns to a significant negative effect and the same also happens in 
Indonesia and Lebanon in the developing country group, though there are less substantial changes 
in the EECA country group. 
 
When we move from across school estimation to school fixed effects estimation in Table 3, the 
results again change much. For developed countries, the positive CSE remains statistically 
significant only for 5 countries, down from 10 countries in Table 1, when we focus only on 
variations inside schools. There is a similar change for the two other groups of countries. On the 
whole, 6 of the EECA countries had statistically significant effects with the school fixed effects 
estimator. The coefficient also seems to be reduced for developing countries where only 4 
countries still have significant coefficients, down from 13 in Table 1.  
However, the school fixed effects estimator will produce biased estimates of the CSE if 
pupils are sorted into smaller or larger classes within their grade in the school on the basis of their 
unobserved characteristics. For instance, even if the school does not have a deliberate policy of 
grouping students by ability, more ambitious/able parents may insist on having their children 
placed in smaller classes within the grade. This would lead to a negative correlation between 
ability and class-size within the school and exaggerate the size of the expected negative 
coefficient on class size.  If this occurs, the coefficient on class-size will be biased (i.e. be a 
bigger negative) even in a school fixed effects estimator since ability is systematically correlated 
with both class size and with student performance within the school.   
To address the problem of the endogeneity of class size even within the school, we now 
use the pupil fixed effects estimator. Under this estimator, the identification of effects comes only 
from across-subject variation in class-size and in achievement score for the same pupil and, as 
such, this is an extremely stringent test for the presence of a class-size effect since it nets out the   14
effect of all subject-invariant pupil and school unobservables. Providing we believe that pupils 
who are bright in math are also bright in science(i.e. if ability is not subject specific within the 
maths-science subject set), this estimator takes care of all student and school level unobservables. 
In order to check for any non-linearity of the class size effect, both linear and quadratic 
specifications are presented.  
When variations in achievement and class-size across subject within the same pupil are 
taken into account in Table 4, the CSE is diminished in all countries, compared with previous 
estimations. This suggests that part of the CSE previously observed across and even within 
school was spurious, arising due to the correlation of class-size with pupil unobservables.   
However, even though diminished, there remains a statistically significant class size effect for 13 
out of the 33 countries for which it was possible to use the pupil fixed effects estimator, though in 
only 8 of these does it have the expected negative sign.  One explanation for the diminished 
coefficients on class-size could be attenuation bias, which is exacerbated in differenced 
estimation. However, this is not an important cause for worry because it seems unlikely that 
measurement error in class-size will be subject-specific within a grade/school.  As long as 
measurement error in class-size for the different subjects is equal and in the same direction, 
differencing will not cause attenuation bias. In any case, we attempt to address any attenuation 
bias by instrumenting class size later in Table 5. 
In general, the CSE in Table 4 is positive for the developed countries, negative for the 
developing countries and mixed for the EECA countries. A significant relation persists only in 4 
developed countries (positive in Australia, Scotland and Sweden and negative in Belgium). The 
CSE in Belgium becomes negative once pupil fixed effects are taken into account, but the effect 
is modest: a 1 SD reduction in class size (by approximately 4 pupils) would increase student 
performance by 0.05 SD, representing an expensive way of raising student achievement. For four 
other countries (England, Hong-Kong, Netherlands, New Zealand), the CSE disappears when   15
pupil fixed effects are taken into account.  The effect differs from country to country for the 
EECA group of countries. For Bulgaria, the effect is more quadratic than linear, with a convex 
relationship and a turning point occurring at 28 pupils (0.0508/(0.0009×2) = 28.22). The various 
thresholds are presented in brackets in the last column of Table 4. No significant CSE is found for 
Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia (and it cannot be estimated for 
Slovakia and the Russian Federation) but for the other EECA countries, a CSE persists. Lastly, a 
CSE exists for 4 countries in the developing country group, while it was significant for 12 of 
them with the Least Squares estimator in Table 1. In all these 4 countries, the CSE is negative and 
linear. For Chile, the pupil fixed effects estimator increases the (negative) CSE, suggesting that 
measurement error bias is not a problem.  The size of the CSE is substantial in Chile: a 1 SD 
reduction in class size (by 7.3 students) raises student achievement by 0.16 SD. However, in the 
other developing countries where there is a statistically significant CSE (Jordan and Palestine), 




In this section, we check the robustness of our pupil fixed effects results.  A potential criticism of 
the pupil fixed effects approach is that its efficacy depends on the assumption that pupil 
unobservables do not vary by subject, i.e. that differencing a student’s marks in different subjects 
nets out all aspects of the student’s unobserved characteristics. But it may be that students are 
more able in, or more motivated to study, particular subjects. If students who are specially 
interested/able in maths are systematically allocated to smaller (or larger) maths classes – either 
because they lobby or because of school policy – then subject-specific class-size may be 
systematically correlated with student unobservables.  While such a concern may seem somewhat 
far-fetched, and while we have already sought to address it in Table 2 where we restrict   16
estimation to students not class-setted by ability, we seek to further control for the possibility of 
different abilities for different subjects.  
If pupil ability differs by subject, the ideal way to control for this would be to have 
indicators of ability for each subject. While such indicators are not available, it is possible to 
build a proxy for subject-specific ability based on the TIMSS database. An indicator of subject-
specific ability has been constructed from five questions asked directly of the pupil. These are 
detailed in Appendix 1.  The first two columns of Table 5 present the results of pupil fixed effects 
achievement equations fitted for each country, which include the subject varying pupil ability 
variable. Although we do not report the underlying achievement regressions for each country, the 
coefficients on the ability variables were positive and significant, i.e. subject-specific ability 
enables pupils to have better results in achievement tests in that subject, as might be expected. 
But what interests us more is the effect of the inclusion of the ability measure on the CSE. 
Compared with the results in Table 4, the CSE here remains roughly identical for the majority of 
the countries. Thus, it appears that subject-varying ability is not systematically or strongly 
correlated with class size. This could be because within a grade in a school students may not be 
able to engineer to sort themselves into smaller classes for those subjects in which they are more 
capable, while remaining in larger classes for the other subjects. 
A potential omitted variable bias occurs if other class-level variables are correlated with 
class size but are omitted from the equation. These can be variables concerning the teachers. 
Indeed, typically, other than class-size, only the teacher characteristics can vary between the 
classes of the same grade in a school. A possible example of bias is then the possibility that there 
is a correlation between the class size and teacher characteristics. For instance, if more 
experienced teachers are, for some reason, systematically allocated to the smaller classes and 
teacher experience affects student achievement, then class-size could ‘pick up’ the effect of 
omitted teacher experience. But in order for this to apply, the correlation of teacher characteristics   17
with class-size would have to be subject-specific, e.g. more experienced maths teachers are 
systematically assigned to teach small (or large) maths classes and more experienced science 
teachers are systematically assigned to small (or large) science classes, something that appears 
unlikely. In any case, in order to check for such omitted variable bias, we introduce four teacher 
characteristics into the estimation: teacher's gender, age, possession of a master-level or higher 
diploma in the subject, and experience entered in quadratic form. Since teacher characteristics 
vary by subject, it is possible to include these variables in pupil fixed effect estimations. The 
results are presented in the columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. Neither the size nor the significance of 
the class size coefficients changes, or when it does, generally the coefficients are higher. We can 
thus conclude that the previous class-size effects are not biased. 
A final robustness test we perform is to see if measurement error is driving the pupil fixed 
effects results. To do this, we instrument class-size with the average class-size in the subject 
across all grades in the school where this is possible (in some countries there is data only on one 
class per school). This is identical to the methodology followed in Woessmann and West (2006) 
but is done here in the context of a pupil fixed effects regression. The results are presented in 
Table 6.  It shows that while the CSE is unaffected by instrumenting in most countries (compared 
with Table 4) the coefficient on class size increases significantly in Australia, Belgium, Scotland 
and Hungary. Thus measurement error did downward bias results. The CSE roughly doubles in 
Australia and Belgium. However, despite this it remains the case that the class size effect is 
statistically significant and of the expected (negative) sign in only 7 out of the 19 countries for 
which it was possible to estimate pupil fixed effects achievement production functions with IV. 
Moreover, the size of the effect is at best modest, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
5.3  Synthesis   18
The magnitude of the CSE estimated in our various regressions is synthesized in Table 7. 
The first column shows the mean and (in parentheses) SD of class size in the country. Columns 2, 
4, 6, 8 and 10 respectively show the effect, on pupil achievement, of a 1 SD reduction in class 
size.  The odd numbered columns represent the class size above which the direction of the class-
size – achievement relationship is reversed in countries where the relationship is quadratic.   
It is clear that neither the direction nor the size of the class-size effects are similar 
acrossthe countries. In addition, it is clear that where effects are present, their size is very small in 
the majority of countries. In the 33 countries for which it was possible to estimate pupil fixed 
effects achievement equations (column 8), a statistically significant effect exists in only 16 and 
among these, the CSE is negative in only 9 countries(it is quadratic in another 2). Finally, among 
these 9 countries, the magnitude of the CSE, following a 1 SD decrease in class size, is greater 
than 0.10 SD of achievement in only 1 country (Chile). A 1 SD reduction in class-size implies a 
large increase in number of teachers, which is costly.  In the developed group of countries, only 
Belgium, Scotland and Sweden have a class-size effect of any magnitude but the sign of the 
effect is positive for Scotland and Sweden.  When measurement error is corrected for (column 
10’s results), class size reductions are beneficial for student achievement in 8 out of 23 countries 
for which estimates could be made but again, the effect size is small – a 1 SD reduction in class 
size results in a 0.10 SD increase in achievement in only 2 out of these 8 countries (Belgium and 
Chile). 
We can compare our results with previous studies. There are hundreds of econometric 
studies seeking to estimate educational production functions. The meta-analyses carried out by 
Hanushek (1997, 2003, 2006) synthesise findings on the impact of class size on pupil 
performance. Of the 276 US estimates of the class-size effect listed by Hanushek (2003), only 
14% found a significant negative class-size effect. Even when he takes only the value-added 
studies estimated within a state, 17% find a significant negative class-size effect. Developing   19
country studies also yield pessimistic conclusions, with only about a quarter (27%) finding a 
significant negative effect. Hanushek and Luque (2003) using TIMSS 1995 data on performance 
of grade 8 pupils in mathematics and sciences, show that 52% of the class size effects were 
positive, while 42% were not statistically significant. Although, Krueger (2003) criticises meta-
analyses for including papers that pay little attention to the endogeneity of class-size in 
achievement production functions, our paper using a stringent methodology to address 
endogeneity confirms the findings of meta-analyses. 
Lastly, we attempt to understand and explain our findings with the help of Table 8. In 
particular we ask whether CSE are smaller in richer countries, supporting a ‘diminishing returns’ 
explanation. We also ask if CSE are smaller in countries where teachers are more skilled. We 
present the results for the three groups of countries as before – the developed countries, the 
EECA countries and the developing countries. We measure resources by per capita GDP in 
purchasing power parity dollars (column 6), and also by per pupil education expenditure (both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of per capita GDP, column 7). Column 4 shows the mean and 
SD of class-size for each country group. Column 3 summarises the CSE in the three country 
types and we trust the pupil fixed effects (PFE) result the most. These ‘effects’ represent the 
number of SD by which student achievement would fall if there was a 1 SD increase in class-size. 
It is clear that the CSE is much greater in developing countries than in the EECA countries and 
that in turn is greater than in the developed countries where, if anything, the CSE is positive 
albeit weak. This follows the hierarchy of per student expenditure on education and also country 
resources.  In developing countries, where resources for education are more limited, reducing 
class size has the largest effect on achievement: a 1 SD reduction in class-size (by 8.2 pupils per 
class) would increase student achievement by 0.06 SD
2; in EECA countries where resources are 
                                                 
2 This is likely to be an over-estimate since it represents the mean of the class-size effect taken only over those 
developing countries where there was a statistically significant class-size effect. If we add the developing countries 
where the class-size effect was not significantly different from zero, i.e. assign a zero class-size effect in those   20
more plentiful, the CSE is small. Thus there is some support for diminishing returns to resources. 
Secondly, teacher quality is measured by teacher education level (column 9), in particular by the 
percentage of teachers with MA qualifications and training. Again in regions where teachers are 
more skilled / higher quality (the EECA and developed countries), the CSE is smaller than in the 
region with the lowest quality teachers, namely developing countries. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The impact of class size on student achievement remains a thorny question for politicians and 
educational decision makers. If class-size reductions could bring a sizeable gain in achievement 
for pupils, decision makers would be tempted to act in this direction. However, recent literature in 
this field leaves researchers as perplexed as policy makers. In his review work, Hanushek (1997, 
2003, 2006) shows the lack of any consistent or strong relationship between class size and pupil 
performance across a large range of studies. 
In this study, we have sought to check the veracity of these findings using a new 
technique that avoids arguably the most important sources of endogeneity bias. We measure the 
class size effect by relating the difference in achievement across subjects to the difference in 
class-size across subjects. A subject-differenced achievement production function helps to 
address the non-random matching of children to specific schools and to classes within schools.  
We proceeded in several stages. Weighted least squares estimates showed significant and 
large class-size effects in a high proportion of the countries studied, though many of the ‘effects’ 
were positive for developed and transition countries. While WLS effects were negative for 
developing countries, they were small in size. Pupil fixed effects estimation of the achievement 
production function powerfully nets out the effect of all subject-invariant pupil, class and school 
unobservable variables. Several tests of robustness were carried out in order to confirm the results 
                                                                                                                                                              
countries and take the mean across all developing countries, the class-size effect on student achievement is only 
about -0.03 SD rather than -0.06 SD, for a one SD increase in class-size.   21
obtained. In particular, we controlled for students’ subject-specific ability, (subject-specific) 
teacher characteristics, and also controlled for measurement error. The results show a statistically 
significant effect of class size for 16 out of 33 countries for which pupil fixed effects achievement 
equation could be fitted. However, in only 10 countries is the effect of the expected negative sign. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the class size effect is small in most cases.  At best, an expensive 1 
SD reduction in class size in developing countries (equal to reducing 8.2 students per class) 
allows pupil scores to increase by only 0.06 standard deviations.  
Our study confirms one of the principal conclusions of Hanushek (2003, 2006) in his 
meta-analyses, namely that class size does not have a systematic or substantial effect on pupil 
performance. Detractors (e.g. Krueger, 2003) have argued that meta-analyses based conclusions 
are flawed because many of the studies that go into meta-analyses are of low quality, for instance, 
across-state or across-school rather than within-state or within-school studies. In the present 
paper, Hanushek’s conclusions are corroborated using a much more stringent methodology that 
accounts for endogeneity in the pupil achievement class-size relationship. We conclude that, 
given the economic implications, class-size reductions do not appear to be a cost-effective 
strategy for raising student achievement levels in developed, developing or transition countries. 
We find that class-size effects are smaller in resource-rich countries than in developing countries, 
supporting the idea of diminishing returns. We also find that class size effects are smaller in 
regions with higher teacher quality, suggesting that more skilful teachers cope better with larger 
classes than less skilful teachers.   22
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Appendix 1 : Evaluation of pupils' "facilities" as a proxy for ability 
 
As mentioned in the robustness section (Section 5.2) of the text, we construct and use a proxy for 
ability for each pupil in each subject. This is calculated starting from 4 questions put directly to 
the pupil for each evaluated subject. As the pupil must answer for each subject, the ‘capability’ 
level built varies between the subjects. 
 
The scale of our capability proxy varies between 0 and 10 and it depends on the 4 variables 
detailed below. The possible answers of the pupil are based on a Likert scale of four occurrences 
(agree a lot, agree a little, disagree a little, disagree a lot).  : 
  "I usually do well in [subject]" 
  "[Subject] is more difficult for me than of many of my classmates" 
  "I enjoy learning [subject]" 
  "I learn things quickly in [subject]" 
 
A score between 1 and 5 is given for each question, the highest value corresponding to the 
response “agree a lot”. The coefficient of “facility” is calculated by carrying out the arithmetic 
mean of the scores obtained. Hence, as we have 4 different variables, a score between 4 and 16 is 
computed. Lastly, for having a score between 0 and 10, we simply multiply this score by 10/16. It 
should be noted that, by construction, the minimum of a score is in fact 2.5 and not 0, but this is 
not a problem for our study.   24
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Table 1 : Weighted Least Squares – Full Sample 
Country    (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
  Class size  Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
  Mean (SD)  Coef.  t Stat  Linear 
Coef. t Stat  Quadratic 
Coef.  t Stat  Turning 
point
Australia 24.16  (4.66) 0.0354*  (9.38) 0.0777* (3.65) -0.0009†  (2.09) 42.7
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15) 0.0440*  (15.08) 0.1546* (7.98) -0.0029*  (5.95) 26.5
England 27.30  (5.55) 0.0402*  (10.15) 0.1260* (8.03) -0.0015*  (5.85) 41.6
Hong-Kong 39.59  (4.06) 0.0631*  (18.35) -0.1021* (5.26) 0.0024*  (8.59) 20.9
Italy 22.05  (3.65) 0.0111*  (2.73) -0.0192 (0.50) 0.0007 (0.81)
Japan 35.57  (3.86) 0.0029  (0.71) -0.0540* (3.67) 0.0014*  (4.64) 29.5
Korea 37.16  (5.26) -0.0052  (1.60) 0.0020 (0.09) -0.0001  (0.33)
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74) 0.0605*  (13.83) 0.0063 (0.21) 0.0011‡  (1.86)
New Zealand 25.88  (4.90) 0.0319*  (8.71) -0.0204 (1.04) 0.0010*  (2.65)
Norway 26.03  (3.82) -0.0094†  (2.27) 0.0205 (1.35) -0.0007 (2.24)
Scotland 24.08  (7.31) 0.0451*  (13.21) 0.0958* (9.88) -0.0009*  (5.13) 51.5
Sweden 21.13  (7.19) 0.0220*  (10.56) 0.0649* (10.62) -0.0009*  (7.79) 37.2
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47) 0.0171*  (7.57) -0.0790* (5.55) 0.0013*  (7.15) 31.1
USA 24.76  (6.81) 0.0013  (0.90) -0.0067 (1.04) 0.0002  (1.42)
        
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20) -0.0214*  (5.84) -0.0196 (1.23) -0.0004 (0.11)
Cyprus 25.65  (4.17) -0.0009  (0.30) 0.0358 (1.52) -0.0008  (1.52)
Estonia 29.22  (6.92) 0.0048†  (2.46) 0.0053 (1.24) 0.0000 (0.18)
Hungary 23.74  (5.56) 0.0114*  (4.33) -0.1021* (5.26) 0.0024*  (8.59) 18.9
Latvia 29.40  (12.29)  0.0033*  (2.87) 0.0037 (0.83) 0.0000 (0.10)
Lithuania 26.39  (4.52) 0.0016  (0.51) -0.0051 (0.40) 0.0001  (0.61)
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19) -0.0067*  (2.75) -0.0116 (0.85) 0.0001 (0.37)
Moldova 25.78  (6.48) 0.0082*  (3.22) 0.0193† (1.93) -0.0002 (1.29)
Romania 25.06  (5.45) -0.0118*  (3.86) -0.1102* (6.93) 0.0020*  (6.98) 27.2
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22) -0.0044  (1.41) -0.0530* (3.16) 0.0011*  (3.10) 23.4
Serbia 26.66  (6.29) 0.0024  (1.18) 0.0132† (2.12) -0.0002†  (2.08) 39.2
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08) 0.0116*  (4.65) 0.1029* (4.78) 0.0023*  (5.45) 21.9
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10) -0.0052  (1.15) -0.0633* (2.59) 0.0015†  (2.46) 21.6
        
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0053*  (5.28) -0.0056 (0.89) 0.0000 (0.05)
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16) -0.0194*  (6.22) -0.0579* (3.82) 0.0006*  (2.53) 45.0
Botswana 37.13  (4.84) -0.0182*  (6.52) -0.2361* (7.62) 0.0031*  (7.07) 38.7
Chile 35.46  (7.32) -0.0016  (1.07) 0.0133 (1.55) -0.0002‡  (1.82)
Egypt 37.40  (7.86) -0.0025†  (1.96) -0.0031 (0.46) 0.0000 (0.10)
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  0.0093*  (8.04) 0.0100‡ (1.92) 0.0000 (0.14)
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92) 0.0120*  (5.48) -0.0141 (1.15) 0.0004†  (2.16)
Iran 29.70  (6.78) -0.0012  (0.69) 0.0091 (1.20) -0.0002  (1.45)
Jordan 26.37  (8.23) -0.0117*  (6.84) -0.0481* (5.19) 0.0006*  (4.11) 43.4
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90) 0.0054*  (3.36) -0.1020 (1.39) 0.0002†  (2.24)
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10) 0.0008  (0.31) -0.2325* (11.93) 0.0032*  (12.04) 36.2
Morocco 42.04  (13.74)  -0.0024  (0.82) -0.0171 (1.28) 0.0002  (1.17)
Palestine 39.52  (8.63) -0.0090*  (5.84) -0.0121‡ (1.86) 0.0000 (0.48)
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.0080*  (7.04) -0.0237* (2.93) 0.0001†  (2.03) 81.8
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46) -0.0050†  (2.34) -0.0040 (0.40) -0.0000 (0.09)
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.0055*  (8.69) -0.0092* (2.88) 0.0000 (1.21)
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42) -0.0062†  (2.52) -0.0283* (2.98) 0.0003†  (2.36) 45.6
Tunisia  34.09  (3.92)  0.0016 (0.55) 0.0107 (0.48) -0.0001  (0.41)   
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement z-score. 
Controlling for student, school and family background variables. Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. 
In order to simplify the lecture, coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or better are in bold. Simple least squares 
(without weighting) gives approximately same results.  Logging class-size also gives results that are not too dissimilar. 
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Table 2: Weighted Least Squares – Reduced Sample (Without Ability Grouped Classes)  
Country    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Class size  Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
  Mean (SD)  Coef.  t Stat  Linear Coef.  t Stat  Quadratic 
Coef.  t Stat  Turning 
point 
Australia  24.16  (4.66)  -0.0024 (0.37) 0.0526 (0.98) -0.0011  (1.04)   
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15)  0.0409*  (10.18)  0.1848*  (6.82)  -0.0037*  (5.56)  
England 27.30  (5.55)  0.0486*  (4.38)  -0.1032*  (3.56)  0.0035*  (5.12) 14.9 
Hong-Kong 39.59  (4.06)  0.0705*  (12.15)  -0.1644*  (4.27)  0.0033*  (5.86) 25.2 
Italy 22.05  (3.65)  -0.0012  (0.30)  -0.1029*  (2.69)  0.0024*  (2.71) 21.8 
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  0.0213*  (5.22)  -0.0901*  (4.33)  0.0026*  (5.68) 32.0 
Korea  37.16  (5.26)  -0.0079 (0.98) -0.0218 (0.25) 0.0002 (0.16)   
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74)  0.0651*  (12.04)  -0.0580‡  (1.64)  0.0025*  (3.68) 11.5 
New Zealand  25.88 (4.90)  0.0287*  (5.83) 0.0230 (0.85) 0.0001  (0.21)   
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  n n n n n  n   
Scotland 24.08  (7.31)  0.0594*  (7.89)  -0.0756†  (1.99)  0.0029*  (3.61) 13.0 
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  -0.0108*  (2.66) -0.0056 (0.34) -0.0001  (0.36)   
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47)  0.0139*  (5.75)  -0.0831*  (5.50)  0.0013*  (6.87) 31.5 
USA 24.76  (6.81)  -0.0052†  (2.07) -0.0167 (1.40) 0.0002 (1.12)   
             
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20)  -0.0181*  (3.30) 0.0082 (0.25) -0.0006  (0.82)   
Cyprus  25.65  (4.17)  0.0006 (0.18) -0.0036 (0.12) 0.0001  (0.13)   
Estonia 29.22  (6.92)  0.0118*  (5.10)  0.0273*  (4.86)  -0.0002*  (3.70) 69.7 
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  0.0213*  (5.22)  -0.0901*  (4.33)  0.0026*  (5.68) 17.7 
Latvia  29.40  (12.29)  0.0022 (1.63) -0.0009 (0.18) 0.0004  (0.70)   
Lithuania  26.39  (4.52)  0.0053 (1.32) 0.0136 (0.89) -0.0002  (0.63)   
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  -0.0015 (0.54) 0.0023 (0.14) -0.0001  (0.24)   
Moldova 25.78  (6.48)  0.0120*  (3.20)  0.0705*  (4.13)  -0.0010*  (3.81) 36.4 
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  -0.0056  (1.30)  -0.0925*  (4.05)  0.0017*  (4.34) 27.2 
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  -0.0094†  (2.04) -0.0227 (1.07) 0.0003 (0.67)   
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  -0.0004  (0.17)  0.0099  (1.33)  -0.0001‡  (1.63)  
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  0.0121*  (4.05)  -0.1291*  (5.38)  0.0029*  (6.04) 22.3 
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10)  -0.0028  (0.42)  -0.1911*  (3.41)  0.0044*  (3.46) 21.9 
             
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0069*  (6.07)  -0.0214*  (2.98)  0.0002†  (2.16) 54.3 
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  -0.0200*  (5.36)  -0.1180*  (6.50)  0.0016*  (5.43) 36.2 
Botswana 37.13  (4.84)  -0.0216*  (7.21)  -0.2006*  (6.14)  0.0025*  (5.51) 39.6 
Chile 35.46  (7.32)  -0.0058*  (3.36) -0.0103 (0.94) 0.0001 (0.43)   
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  0.0005  (0.36)  -0.0232*  (2.67)  0.0003*  (2.82) 42.7 
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  0.0077*  (5.91)  0.0133†  (2.03) -0.0001  (0.89)   
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92)  0.0132*  (5.25) 0.0193 (1.08) -0.001  (0.35)   
Iran 29.70  (6.78)  -0.0044  (1.07)  0.0739†  (2.07)  -0.0013†  (2.23) 27.8 
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  -0.0098*  (5.44)  -0.0392*  (3.76)  0.0004*  (2.90) 45.3 
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90)  0.0065*  (3.79) -0.0039 (0.49) 0.0002 (1.34)   
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  -0.0045  (1.16)  -0.1773*  (6.47)  0.0025*  (6.23) 35.7 
Morocco  42.04  (13.74)  -0.0049 (1.42) 0.0007 (0.03) -0.0001  (0.22)   
Palestine 39.52  (8.63)  -0.0068*  (3.85) -0.0085 (1.14) 0.0000 (0.24)   
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.0135*  (9.74)  -0.0697*  (9.01)  0.0005*  (7.53) 67.4 
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  -0.0060†  (2.54) -0.0001 (0.01) -0.0001  (0.55)   
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.0064*  (9.15)  -0.0079†  (2.06) 0.0000  (0.40)   
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  -0.0028  (0.96)  -0.0215‡  (1.70) 0.0002  (1.51)   
Tunisia  34.09  (3.92)  -0.0019 (0.50) 0.0223 (0.80) -0.0004  (0.88)   
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement z-score. 
Controlling for student, school and family background variables. Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. 
In order to simplify the lecture, coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or better are in bold. Only pupils who are not 
present in classes grouped by ability are included in the regression (WLS reduced sample regression). See text for more details.   28
Table 3 : School Fixed Effect Estimation 
Country 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Class size  Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
Mean (SD)  Coef.  t Stat  Coef.  t Stat  Coef.  t Stat  Turning point 
Australia 24.16  (4.66)  0.0174*  (2.86) -0.0194 (0.68) 0.0009  (1.31) 
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15)  -0.0001  (0.03) -0.0694* (4.10) 0.0019*  (4.29) 18.1
England 27.30  (5.55)  0.0391*  (8.17) 0.1376* (7.91) -0.0017*  (5.95) 40.7
Hong-Kong 39.59  (4.06) 0.0035  (0.95) 0.0206 (0.90) -0.0003  (0.75) 
Italy 22.05  (3.65)  -0.0209*  (2.69) -0.1765* (2.53) 0.0036†  (2.27) 24.3
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  0.0029  (0.17) 0.0669 (0.52) -0.0010  (0.51) 
Korea 37.16  (5.26)  0.0001  (0.01) -0.0489 (1.34) 0.0007  (1.22) 
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74) -0.0011  (0.16) -0.0464 (1.25) 0.0011  (1.19) 
New Zeland 25.88  (4.90) 0.0041  (0.82) -0.0705* (3.33) 0.0017*  (3.73) 20.9
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  0.0005  (0.05) 0.0106 (0.32) -0.0002  (0.28) 
Scotland 24.08  (7.31)  0.0122*  (4.06) 0.0317* (3.50) -0.0003†  (2.10) 96.4
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  0.0216*  (8.88) 0.0740* (11.52) -0.0010*  (8.93) 35.9
Taïwan 37.24  (5.47)  0.0898  (0.78)  
USA 24.76  (6.81)  0.0043†  (2.06) 0.0033 (0.43) 0.0000 (0.14) 
      
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20)  -0.0141  (1.49) -0.0748† (2.27) 0.0014*  (2.45) 26.1
Cyprus 25.65  (4.17)  -0.0007  (0.23) 0.0039 (0.15) -0.0001  (0.18) 
Estonia 29.22  (6.92)  0.0066*  (2.93) 0.0161* (3.00) -0.0001†  (2.11) 72.2
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  -0.0026  (0.83) -0.0023 (0.11) 0.0000  (0.01) 
Latvia 29.40  (12.29)  0.0028†  (2.10) 0.0056 (0.85) -0.0000 (0.48) 
Lituania 26.39  (4.52)  0.0055‡  (1.67) 0.0109 (0.84) -0.0001 (0.44) 
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  0.0192*  (3.55) 0.0833* (3.35) -0.0010*  (2.64) 40.5
Moldova 25.78  (6.48)  0.0047  (1.14) 0.0220 (1.27) -0.0003  (1.10) 
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  0.0036  (1.05) 0.0563* (3.21) -0.0009*  (3.29) 31.2
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  -0.0228  (0.75) 0.2310 (1.06) -0.0050  (1.20) 
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  -0.0022  (0.97) -0.0055 (0.70) 0.0000  (0.42) 
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  0.0221*  (2.78) 0.0091 (0.17) 0.0003 (0.25) 
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10)  -0.0066‡  (1.69) -0.0102 (0.54) 0.0001 (0.19) 
      
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0009  (0.97) -0.0051 (0.85) 0.0001  (0.71) 
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  -0.0117†  (1.97) -0.0835* (2.69) 0.0012†  (2.35) 35.3
Botswana 37.13  (4.84)  0.0033  (0.23) -0.0220 (0.17) 0.0004  (0.20) 
Chile 35.46  (7.32)  -0.0212‡  (1.89) 0.0075 (0.19) -0.0005 (0.64) 
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  -0.0024  (0.63) 0.0113 (0.36) -0.0002  (0.46) 
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  -0.0053  (0.78) 0.0140 (0.28) -0.0002  (0.39) 
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92)  0.0030  (0.53) 0.0848 (0.48) -0.0010  (0.46) 
Iran 29.70  (6.78)  -0.0006  (0.18) 0.0080 (0.60) -0.0001  (0.67) 
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  -0.0121  (1.38) -0.3859 (0.85) 0.0005  (0.64) 
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90)  0.0016  (0.52) -0.0088 (0.40) 0.0001  (0.50) 
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  0.0426*  (2.98) -0.0193 (0.14) 0.0008 (0.45) 
Morocoo 42.04  (13.74)  0.0151  (1.14) -0.01425 (1.33) 0.0023  (1.52) 
Palesti. N.A.  39.52 (8.63)  -0.0055†  (2.10) -0.0070 (0.65) 0.0000 (0.14) 
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.0004  (0.11) 0.0125 (0.39) -0.0001  (0.41) 
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  -0.0030  (0.41) -0.1289* (2.52) 0.0019*  (2.60) 33.7
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.0012  (1.01) -0.0067 (0.82) 0.0000  (0.68) 
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  -0.0024  (0.32) -0.0350 (1.20) 0.0007  (1.25) 
Tunisia 34.09  (3.92)  0.0005  (0.09) -0.0132 (0.33) 0.0002  (0.33) 
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: Actual class size. 
Controlling for student, school and family background variables. Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. 
In order to simplify the lecture, coefficients significant at the 10th percent level are indicated in bold. Controlling for school 
fixed effects and student- and family-background.   29
Table 4: Pupil Fixed Effect Estimation 
Country    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Class size  Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
  Mean (SD)  Coef.  t Stat  Linear  
Coef.  t Stat  Quadratic 
Coef.  t Stat  Turning  
point 
Australia 24.16  (4.66)  0.0122*  (2.71) 0.0065 (0.32) 0.0001  (0.27) 
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15)  -0.0140*  (2.43) 0.0330 (1.00) -0.0012 (1.46) 
England 27.30  (5.55)  -0.0007  (0.16) -0.0038 (0.20) 0.0001  (0.19) 
Hong-Kong 39.59  (4.06)  0.0013  (0.37) -0.0207 (0.85) 0.0004  (0.93) 
Italy 22.05  (3.65)  n  n n n n n 
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  n n n n n n 
Korea 37.16  (5.26)  0.0021  (0.47) -0.0156 (0.50) 0.0002  (0.57) 
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74)  -0.0025 (0.41) -0.0400 (1.27) 0.0009  (1.17) 
New Zealand 25.88  (4.90) -0.0045  (0.83) -0.0340 (1.39) 0.0006  (1.21) 
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  n  n n n n n 
Scotland 24.08  (7.31)  0.0065†  (2.26) 0.0106 (0.95) -0.0001 (0.39) 
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  0.0074*  (3.59) 0.0211* (3.33) -0.0003†  (2.45) 42.0
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47)  n  n n n n n 
USA 24.76  (6.81)  0.0008  (0.68) -0.0015 (0.35) 0.0000  (0.57) 
      
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20)  -0.0146†  (2.42) -0.0630* (3.08) 0.0011*  (3.07) 27.7
Cyprus 25.65  (4.17)  0.0013  (0.63) 0.0273 (1.22) -0.0006  (1.17) 
Estonia 29.22  (6.92)  -0.0002  (0.18) 0.0014 (0.42) -0.0000  (0.64) 
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  -0.0051†  (2.31) -0.0159 (1.21) 0.0002 (0.88) 
Latvia 29.40  (12.29)  0.0020†  (2.42) 0.0019 (0.52) 0.0000 (0.04) 
Lithuania 26.39  (4.52)  -0.0020  (0.92) -0.0103 (1.51) 0.0002  (1.36) 
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  0.0048 (1.23) -0.0161 (0.70) 0.0003 (0.95) 
Moldova 25.78  (6.48)  0.0109†  (2.55) 0.0306‡ (1.77) -0.0003 (1.24) 
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  -0.0008  (0.36) 0.0138 (1.08) -0.0002  (1.25) 
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  n  n n n n n 
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  -0.0029†  (2.43) -0.0014 (0.26) -0.0000 (0.29) 
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  n  n n n n n 
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10)  -0.0012  (0.41) -0.0241‡ (1.68) 0.0007‡  (1.65) 16.8
      
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0022*  (3.50) -0.0006 (0.15) -0.0000 (0.43) 
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  -0.0006  (0.11) -0.1038† (1.98) 0.0016†  (1.97) 31.7
Botswana 37.13  (4.84) n  n n n n n 
Chile 35.46  (7.32)  -0.0218†  (2.32) 0.0082 (0.25) -0.0008 (0.82) 
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  -0.0023  (0.95) -0.0013 (0.07) -0.0000  (0.05) 
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  n  n n n n n 
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92) n  n n n n n 
Iran 29.70  (6.78)  0.0018  (0.66) 0.0127 (1.30) -0.0002  (1.22) 
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  -0.0084†  (1.97) -0.0324 (1.31) 0.0004 (1.01) 
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90)  0.0010  (0.39) -0.0160 (0.87) 0.0002  (0.95) 
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  n  n n n n n 
Morocco 42.04  (13.74)  n  n n n n n 
Palestine 39.52  (8.63)  -0.0053*  (3.08) -0.0044 (0.64) -0.0000 (0.13) 
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.0007 (0.27) 0.0011 (0.05) -0.0000  (0.08) 
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  n  n n n n n 
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.0015  (1.28) -0.0102 (1.45) 0.0001  (1.25) 
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  0.0022  (0.43) -0.0235 (1.22) 0.0005  (1.45) 
Tunisia 34.09  (3.92)  -0.0003  (0.06) -0.0075 (0.22) 0.0001  (0.22) 
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement z-score. 
Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. In order to simplify the presentation, coefficients significant at 
the 10 percent level or better are in bold. Controlling for pupil fixed effects.   30
Table 5: Robustness check for the Pupil Fixed Effect estimation 
Country   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Class  size  With ability variable  With teacher controls 
  Mean (SD)  Coef.  t Stat  Coef.  t Stat  24.16 (4.66) 
Australia 20.77  (4.15)  0.0127* (2.83) 0.0132*  (2.90)
Belgium (Fl.)  27.30 (5.55)  -0.0128† (2.22) -0.0146*  (2.51)
England 39.59  (4.06)  0.0007 (0.18) -0.0005  (0.12)
Hong-Kong 22.05  (3.65)  0.0010 (0.29) 0.0017  (0.46)
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  n n n  n
Korea 37.16  (5.26)  0.0037 (0.87) 0.0024  (0.51)
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74)  -0.0029 (0.49) -0.0032  (0.51)
New Zealand 25.88  (4.90)  -0.0019 (0.37) -0.0022  (0.39)
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  n n n  n
Scotland 24.08  (7.31)  0.0075* (2.57) 0.0060†  (2.09)
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  0.0067* (3.32) 0.0087*  (3.83)
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47)  n n n  n
USA 24.76  (6.81)  0.0006 (0.52) 0.0007  (0.62)
    
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20)  -0.0146† (2.44) -0.0150†  (2.47)
Cyprus 25.65  (4.17)  0.0018 (0.86) 0.0023  (1.07)
Estonia 29.22  (6.92)  -0.0001 (0.05) -0.0005  (0.37)
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  -0.0052† (2.38) -0.0053†  (2.40)
Latvia 29.40  (12.29)  0.0022* (2.71) 0.0018†  (2.15)
Lithuania 26.39  (4.52)  -0.0773‡ (1.67) -0.0801‡  (1.72)
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  0.0039 (1.01) 0.0062 (1.58)
Moldova 25.78  (6.48)  0.0108* (2.52) 0.0106*  (2.47)
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  -0.0010 (0.49) -0.0017  (0.82)
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  n n n  n
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  -0.0027† (2.28) -0.0030†  (2.44)
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  n n n  n
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10)  -0.0244‡ (1.69)q -0.0240‡  (1.66)
    
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0022* (3.51) -0.0025*  (3.86)
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  -0.0899‡ (1.70)q -0.0840 (1.55)q
Botswana 37.13  (4.84)  n n n  n
Chile 35.46  (7.32)  -0.0157‡ (1.66) -0.0250*  (2.65)
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  -0.0026 (1.08) -0.0012  (0.47)
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  n n n  n
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92)  n n n  n
Iran 29.70  (6.78)  0.0004 (0.14) 0.0022  (0.81)
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  -0.0084† (1.97) -0.0127*  (2.66)
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90)  0.0009 (0.38) 0.0013  (0.48)
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  n n n  n
Morocco 42.04  (13.74)  0.0191 (0.74) 0.0164  (0.62)
Palestine N.A.  39.52 (8.63)  -0.0053* (3.13) -0.0046†  (2.50)
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.0000 (0.02) -0.0021  (0.80)
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  n n n  n
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.1186† (1.91)l -0.1084‡  (1.71)l
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  0.0030 (0.58) -0.0364‡  (0.23)q
Tunisia 34.09  (3.92)  -0.0001 (0.01) 0.0007  (0.16)
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement z-score. 
Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. In order to simplify the presentation, coefficients significant at 
the 10 percent level or better are in bold. Controlling for pupil fixed effects. For some countries, we show the quadratic relation 
instead of the simple linear form (marked by a ‘q’) because coefficients from linear estimation are not statistically significant.   
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Table 6: Pupil Fixed Effect Estimation with IV technique 
Country    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Class size  Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
  Mean (SD)  Coef. t  Stat  Linear  
Coef.  t Stat  Quadratic 
Coef.  t Stat  Turning 
point 
Australia 24.16  (4.66)  0.0210*  (4.27) 0.5474‡ (1.61) -0.0116  (1.57) 23.7
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15)  -0.0303*  (3.89) -0.4583* (2.74) 0.0112*  (2.64) 
England 27.30  (5.55)  0.0007  (0.15) 0.0319 (0.37) -0.0005  (0.37) 
Hong-Kong 39.59  (4.06)  -0.0001 (0.03) 0.1087 (0.83) -0.0018  (0.81) 
Italy 22.05  (3.65)  n  n n n n  n 
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  n  n n n n  n 
Korea 37.16  (5.26)  0.0010  (0.25) 0.2100 (0.96) -0.0028  (0.96) 
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74)  na  na na na na  na 
New Zealand 25.88  (4.90) -0.0059  (0.91) -0.1481 (0.66) 0.0030  (0.65) 
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  n  n n n n  n 
Scotland 24.08  (7.31)  0.0093*  (3.26) 0.0554† (2.28) -0.0008†  (2.04) 33.7
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  0.0058*  (2.87) 0.0081 (0.66) -0.0000 (0.20) 
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47)  n  n n n n n 
USA 24.76  (6.81)  0.0009  (0.75) -0.0009 (0.04) 0.0000  (0.09) 
        
Bulgaria 23.15  (5.20)  -0.0147†  (2.45) -0.0652* (2.87) 0.0012*  (2.81) 27.6
Cyprus 25.65  (4.17)  0.0026  (0.96) 0.0635 (1.29) -0.0015  (1.29) 
Estonia 29.22  (6.92)  -0.0001  (0.06) 0.0028 (0.65) -0.0000  (0.84) 
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  -0.0092*  (3.64) -0.1483* (3.35) 0.0031*  (3.26) 24.0
Latvia 29.40  (12.29)  0.0019†  (2.37) 0.0012 (0.28) 0.0000 (0.20) 
Lithuania 26.39  (4.52)  -0.0034  (1.36) -0.0921‡ (1.82) 0.0015‡  (1.80) 30.9
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  0.0048  (1.22) -0.0160 (0.59) 0.0003 (0.79) 
Moldova 25.78  (6.48)  0.0115*  (2.78) 0.0394† (2.18) -0.0004‡  (1.68) 46.5
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  0.0007  (0.21) 0.0206 (0.89) -0.0003  (0.98) 
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  n  n n n n  n 
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  -0.0027†  (2.12) 0.0088 (0.85) -0.0001 (1.12) 
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  n  n n n n  n 
Slovenia 22.05  (4.10)  -0.0012  (0.42) -0.0338‡ (1.71) 0.0010‡  (1.68) 16.8
        
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.0021*  (3.01) 0.0015 (0.18) -0.0000 (0.45) 
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  0.0050  (0.84) 0.9047 (1.02) -0.0142  (1.02) 
Botswana 37.13  (4.84) n  n n n n  n 
Chile 35.46  (7.32)  -0.0248†  (2.06) 0.0125 (0.16) -0.0005 (0.43) 
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  na  na na na na  na 
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  n n n n n n 
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92)  n  n n n n  n 
Iran 29.70  (6.78)  na  na na na na  na 
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  na  na na na na  na 
Lebanon 29.16  (7.90)  na  na na na na na 
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  n  n n n n  n 
Morocco 42.04  (13.74)  n  n n n n  n 
Palestine   39.52 (8.63)  -0.0054*  (2.94) -0.0079 (0.37) 0.0000 (0.12) 
Philippines 54.75  (10.81) na  na na na na  na 
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  n  n n n n  n 
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  na  na na na na  na 
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  na  na na na na  na 
Tunisia 34.09  (3.92)  na na na na na  na 
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement z-score. 
Numbers is parenthesis represents robust absolute t statistics. In order to simplify the presentation, coefficients significant at 
the 10 percent level or better are in bold. The instrument used is the average class-size in the subject across all grades in the 
school. For some countries, we cannot perform this estimation because only one class per school is tested (countries marked by 
an asterisk: ‘na’ means ‘not applicable’). See table A.5 for background data and table A.6 for first-stage estimates.   32
 Table 7: Synthesis of results 
Country 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Class size 
WLS  WLS RS  SFE  PFE  PFE IV 
Lin. Quad. Lin.  Quad. Lin. Quad. Lin. Quad. Lin. Quad. 
Australia 26.16  (4.66) 0.16  -n s 0.08 0.06  -0.33  23.7
Belgium (Fl.)  20.77 (4.15)  0.18  0.16 0.05 18.1 -0.06    -0.13 
England 27.30  (5.55)  0.22  0.51 14.9 0.24 40.7 - ns   +  ns 
Hong-Kong  39.59 (4.06)  0.37  20.9 0.41 25.2 + ns + ns    - ns 
Italy 22.05  (3.65)  0.04  0.02 21.8 -0.05 24.3 n   n 
Japan 35.57  (3.86)  0.18  29.5 0.38 32 +  ns n   n 
Korea  37.16 (5.26)  - ns  - ns + ns + ns    + ns 
Netherlands 26.01  (3.74)  0.23  0.28 11.5 - ns - ns   n 
New Zealand  25.88 (4.90)  0.16  0.14 0.09 20.9 - ns   - ns 
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  -0.04  n +  ns n   n 
Scotland  24.08  (7.31)  0.33  0.49 13 0.12 96.4 0.05  0.12  33.7
Sweden 21.13  (7.19)  0.16  -0.06 0.22 35.9 0.06  42  0.04 
Taiwan 37.24  (5.47)  0.10  31.1 0.08 31.5 +  ns n   n 
USA  24.76 (6.81)  + ns  -0.04 0.03 + ns    + ns 
        
Bulgaria  23.15  (5.20)  -0.11  -0.09 -0.04 26.1 -0.06 27.7 -0.04 27.6
Cyprus  25.65 (4.17)  - ns  + ns - ns + ns    + ns 
Estonia  29.22 (6.92)  0.03  0.08 0.07 72.2 - ns   - ns 
Hungary 23.74  (5.56)  0.08  18.9 0.20 17.7 - ns -0.03    -0.05 
Latvia  29.40  (12.29)  0.04  +  ns 0.03 0.02  0.02 
Lithuania  26.39 (4.52)  + ns  + ns 0.02 - ns   -0.05  30.9
Macedonia 28.14  (5.19)  -0.03  - ns 0.14 40.5 +  ns  +  ns 
Moldova  25.78  (6.48)  0.05  0.08 +  ns 0.07  0.12  46.5
Romania 25.06  (5.45)  -0.06  -0.03 27.2 0.06 31.2 - ns   +  ns 
Russian Fed.  24.40 (5.22)  0.01  23.4 -0.05 - ns n   n 
Serbia 26.66  (6.29)  0.01  39.2 - ns - ns -0.02    -0.02 
Slovakia 25.80  (5.08)  0.06  0.12 22.3 0.11 n   n 
Slovenia  22.05  (4.10)  0.04 21.6 0.03 21.9 -0.03 0.03 16.8 0.05 16.8
        
Armenia 31.79  (11.66)  -0.06  -0.08 - ns -0.03    -0.02 
Bahrain 30.70  (5.16)  -0.10  -0.11 -0.04 35.3 -0.02  31.7  +  ns 
Botswana 37.13  (4.84)  -0.09  -0.11 +  ns n   n 
Chile  35.46 (7.32)  - ns  -0.04 -0.16 -0.16    -0.18 
Egypt 37.40  (7.86)  -0.02  0.00 42.7 - ns - ns   n 
Ghana 38.36  (11.76)  0.11  0.09 - ns n   n 
Indonesia 40.57  (5.92)  0.07  0.08 +  ns n   n 
Iran  29.70 (6.78)  - ns  -0.03 27.8 - ns + ns    n 
Jordan 26.37  (8.23)  -0.10 -0.15 45.3 - ns -0.07    n 
Lebanon  29.16 (7.90)  0.04  0.05 + ns + ns    n 
Malaysia 37.10  (5.10)  0.04  36.2 0.05 35.7 0.22 n   n 
Morocoo  42.04 (13.74)  - ns  - ns + ns n   n 
Palestine. 39.52  (8.63)  -0.08  -0.06 -0.05 -0.05    -0.05 
Philippines 54.75  (10.81)  -0.09  -0.16 67.4 - ns - ns   n 
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  -0.04  -0.05 -0.13 33.7 n   n 
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  -0.08  -0.10 - ns -0.02    n 
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  -0.06  -0.20 - ns + ns    n 
Tunisia  34.09 (3.92)  + ns  - ns + ns - ns   n 
Note : Coefficients present in the columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) represent the effect, on pupil achievement, of a 1 SD reduction in class 
size. “ns” indicates that the relation is not statistically significant. A “+” or “-”  before the “ns”  indicates that the relation is respectively 
positive and negative but insignificant. “n” indicates that the regression is not possible for this country. The numbers in columns (3), (5), 
(7), (9) and (11) represent the class size above which the direction of the class-size/achievement relationship is reversed. See text for more 
information. WLS means Weighted Least Square regression  (see table 1) ; WLS-RS: Weighted Least Squares with Reduced Sample (see 
table 2) ; SFE : School Fixed Effect (see table 3) ; PFE: Pupil Fixed Effect  (see table 4) ; PFE-IV: Pupil Fixed Effect and Instrumental 
Variable technique  (see table 6). 





Table 8: Country characteristics and the existence of class-size effects 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 




Expenditure per  









  No . of 












with MA & 
training 
Developed countries  14 0.17  0.03  28.59  5.14  532  74  29347  7071  24  38465  1.36  2.10 22  18 
EEC countries  13 0.01  0.00  26.26  6.39  494  79  10544  3486  24  10958  0.76  1.39 18  21 
Developing countries  18 -0.03  -0.06  36.47  8.17  397  85  7653  1351 20  na  na  2.66  6  33 
World mean (total)  45 0.05  -0.01  30.74  6.64  471  80  14846  4208  23  36173  1.31  2.12 15  24 
(3): Weighted Least Squares estimates. Source: Table 7.; Pupil Fixed Effects estimates. Source: Table 7.  Note that these ‘effects’ represent the number of SD by which student 
achievement would fall if there was a 1 SD increase in class-size. Thus, a 1 SD reduction in class-size in developing countries (by a large 8.2 pupils per class) would increase student 
achievement by 0.06 SD. 
(4) – (5): Simple mean and SD of class size; Simple mean of mathematics and science test score. Source: Tables A.1 and A.3. 
(6): GDP per capita, 2003 (PPP $US). Source: UIS-Unesco (2008). 
(7): Real government expenditure per pupil at secondary school, 2003. Source: UIS-Unesco (2008). 
(8): Teacher salaries in lower secondary education, 2003 (Annual statutory salaries at 15 years experience in public institutions; PPP equivalent US dollars). Source : OECD (2004). 
And average real salary of primary school teachers relative to GDP per capita, 1990 (PPP-adjusted 1985 international dollars). Source: Lee and Barro (2001). 
(9): % of TIMSS (grade 8 maths & science) teachers with MA and some training. Source: TIMSS teacher data. Some countries omitted or modified options in accordance with their 
national systems. 
(10): % of TIMSS (grade 8 maths & science) teachers reporting that their teaching is limited "a great deal" by a high student/teacher ratio. Source: TIMSS teacher data. 
 
Note: The developed country group includes 13 countries (Australia, Belgium, England, Hong-Kong, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, 
Sweden, Taiwan and United States). The Eastern European (EEC) group includes 13 countries ( Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovenia and Sloak Republic). The developing countries group includes 18 countries (Armenia, Bahrain, Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Palestinian N.A., Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia).  The world group include all 
the 45 countries cited above. It should be noted that all these countries are not included in the CSE with Pupil Fixed Effect estimation, see table 4. 
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Appendix Table A1 : Mean of Raw (Non-Standardized) Scores 
Country Subjects  Average Scores 
MAT SCI PHY BIO CHE GEO 
Australia 2 496  (78) 521 (74)  
Belgium (Fl.)  3 547 (67) 545 (56)   522 (63)
England  2 541 (84) 499 (78)  
Hong-Kong  2 587 (70) 557 (65)  
Italy  2 483 (76) 489 (78)  
Japan  2 568 (79) 551 (70)  
Korea  2 588 (83) 561 (70)  
Netherlands  3 541 (68) 543 (59)   541 (57)
New Zealand  2 489 (75) 517 (75)  
Norway  2 461 (70) 490 (71)  
Saudi Arabia  2 366 (81) 397 (73)  
Scotland  2 504 (73) 518 (74)  
Sweden  2 497 (72) 521 (77)  
Taiwan  2 585 (98) 576 (81)  
USA  2 505 (79) 530 (80)  
    
Bulgaria  5 484 (85) 480 (83) 469 (88) 484 (89)  487 (87)
Cyprus  4 461 (80) 449 (76) 440 (78)  446 (77)
Estonia  5 534 (69) 547 (64) 546 (64) 553 (59)  557 (72)
Hungary  5 531 (78) 540 (76) 538 (72) 562 (76)  538 (75)
Latvia  4 517 (72) 515 (62) 516 (65) 523 (73) 
Lithuania  5 507 (76) 520 (62) 520 (70) 536 (70)  515 (76)
Macedonia  5 437 (88) 457 (82) 450 (95) 466 (100)  441 (100)
Moldova  3 459 (79) 479 (75)   467 (79)
Romania  5 480 (88) 475 (81) 477 (90) 472 (94)  472 (94)
Russian Fed.  5 510 (76) 512 (73) 516 (75) 529 (80)  519 (78)
Serbia  5 479 (89) 474 (86) 468 (85) 475 (90)  473 (94)
Slovak Rep.  5 522 (87) 531 (76) 526 (79) 529 (79)  537 (86)
Slovenia  4 494 (70) 508 (58) 521 (70) 534 (70) 
    
Armenia  5 480 (83) 482 (74) 454 (85) 467 (102)  464 (91)
Bahrain  2 405 (76) 439 (74)  
Botswana  2 365 (70) 361 (86)  
Chile  2 399 (85) 421 (86)  
Egypt  2 440 (97) 450 (104)  
Ghana  2 283 (91) 258 (120)  
Indonesia  3 419 (88) 439 (84) 433 (75)  
Iran  2 415 (75) 455 (73)  
Jordan  2 422 (88) 472 (89)  
Lebanon  4 439 (66) 434 (80) 448 (89)  376 (106)
Malaysia  2 508 (74) 510 (67)  
Morocco(1)  2 388 (68) 399 (69)  
Palestine  2 391 (91) 437 (92)  
Philippines  2 379 (85) 379 (99)  
South Africa  2 269 (105) 249 (129)  
Syrian A.R.  2 361 (78) 413 (79)  
Tunisia  2 411 (60) 402 (60)  
Note : MAT = maths ; SCI = science ; PHY = physics ; CHE = chemistry ; BIO = biology; GEO = geography. 
For Lebanon, score in last column is for "Life and Earth Science" and not geography. 
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Appendix Table A2: Descriptive statistics on control variables (continued on next page) 
  ARM AUS BFL BGL BHR BWA CHL CYP EGY ENG EST GHA  HKG  HUN IDN IRN  ITA  JOR JPN KOR LBN  LIT  LTV 
Age  (in  months)  245 180 176 186 176 195 184 172 179 178 189 193 179 183 180 181 174 174 183 183 181 186 187 
Sex  (1=  Female)  53 51 53 49 49 51 50 49 48 49 49 45 50 51 51 43 49 52 49 48 57 50 51 
Speaks national language 
at home                         
          1=Always  80 84 78 82 66  5  87 78 57 90 89 23 77 95 21 55 94 72 94 70  5  88 78 
          2=Often  16  10  11  11  15 6  9 13  17 8  8 11  15 4 12  10 2 13 4 29  12  10  15 
          3=Sometimes  3  5  8  6 14  80 4  6 23 2  2 61 7  0 58  21 3 12 1  1 69 2  5 
          4=Never  1 1 3 1 4 9 0 2 3 0 1 5 1 0  10  14  1 3 0 0  14  1 2 
B o o k s   a t   h o m e                          
          Less  than  10  14  5  12 12 11 50 21 11 26 12  2  33 28  4  33 39 13 23 13 15 21  9  3 
          11-25  24 10 24 14 26 29 36 27 35 17 11 34 28 14 44 30 28 33 22 10 35 27 11 
          26-100  29 29 35 25 31 13 29 35 22 29 22 16 27 29 19 18 25 27 32 32 27 36 31 
          101-200  14  24  16  18  14 4  9 16 9 19  18 6  9 22 3  5 14 8 17  23 8 16  26 
          More  than  200  19  31  12  31  17 4  6 11 8 23  47  11 9 32 1  8 20 9 17  20 8 12  30 
Possess  a  computer  19 95 96 41 81 15 44 83 35 95 69 25 97 75 17 28 84 40 82  2  61 51 47 
Mother  born  in  country  93 70 89 98 81 95 99 89 89 92 81 91 50 97 97 97 93 75 99 99 93 95 81 
Father  born  in  country  94 69 88 98 84 93 98 91 87 91 80 89 53 98 97 97 94 71 99 99 94 93 80 
Student  born  in  country  96 87 94 95 89 96 96 88 79 95 96 69 74 97 88 99 95 75 99 99 88 96 96 
P a r e n t s '   h i g h e s t   e d u c a t i o n                          
        University  52 29 27 33 35  9  21 29 45 25 42 11 13 37  9  11 21 33 44 36 20 39 46 
        Technical  post-second. 21 27 27 35  6  13 10 14 Na 12 38 17 12 na  6  10  5  15 17 15 23 31 na 
        Upper  Secondary  24 26 30 26 22 15 31 36  9  54 18 24 35 49 25 14 39 32 36 40 19 28 32 
        Lower  Secondary  2  15 11  5  20 20 28 14 21  9  2  36 25 13 21 22 29 12  2  7  15  2  22 
    No more than Primary  1  3  4  1  17  43  10  7  25  na  0  12  15  0  39  43  5  8  na  2  24  1  0 
C i t y   s i z e                          
     More than 500,000  17  32  2  13  7  2  25  na  26  17  4  19  36  10  23  27  13  22  24  48  21  8  30 
          100,001-500,000  9 20 8 22 4  3 30  23  13  22  27  13  53  15 6 19  13 7 39  25  13  23 8 
          50,001-100,000  7  12 16 17 11 11 14 21 12 25 13  7  3  8  12 11 15 13 12  9  8  7  6 
          15,001-50,000  15 19 55 15 33 26 15 14 17 13 14 10  7  25 18 10 24 18 17 11 19 20 13 
          3,001-15,000  35 12 18 17 35 34  9  43 24 19 27 35 na 25 34 15 30 30  8  5  25 24 24 
     Less than 3,000  17  5  Na  16  10  24  7  na  8  4  14  17  na  17  8  18  4  11  0  2  14  17  19 
Computers in school  10  121  47 12 17 15 17 23 10  200  25  1  93 20 11  1  20 16 40 54 18 22 25 
Note : ARM = Armenia ; AUS = Australia ; BFL = Belgium (Flemish) ; BGL = Bulgaria ; BHR = Bahrain ; BWA = Botswana ; CHL = Chile ; CYP = Cyprus ;  EGY = Egypt ; ENG = 
England ; EST = Estonia ; GHA = Ghana ; HKG = Hong-Kong ; HUN = Hungary ; IDN = Indonesia ; IRN = Iran ; ITA = Italy ; JOR = Jordan ; JPN = Japan ; KOR = Korea ; LBN = 
Lebanon ; LIT = Lithuania ; LTV = Latvia.   36
Appendix Table A2: Descriptive statistics on control variables (continued) 
  MAR MKD MOL MYS NLD NOR NZL PHL PSE ROM  RUS SAU SCO SER SVK SLO SWE SYR TUN TWN USA ZAF 
Age  (in  months)  189 183 186 186 179 174 182 186 177 187 178 175 172 185 179 173 186 176 185 178 178 194 
Sex  (1=  Female)  53 50 51 58 49 50 50 57 52 52 50 45 49 49 49 50 51 54 53 48 52 50 
Speaks national 
language at home                        
          1=Always  31 88 68 50 83 84 80  2  74 86 88  100  92 93 80 81 80 52 50 44 84 20 
          2=Often  17  4  19 15 12 11 13  4  11  9  9  0  5  5  13 11 11 12 13 36 10  9 
          3=Sometimes  42 5 12  28  4 3 6  80  12  4 2 0 2 2 6 6 7  31  28  19  5  57 
          4=Never  10 2 1 7 1 1 1  14  2 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 5 9 1 1  14 
B o o k s   a t   h o m e                         
     Less than 10  30  16  22  17  9  6  8  43  26  16  3  23  15  20  4  7  7  26  23  17  12  44 
          11-25  39 39 36 40 18 11 15 34 36 24 15 34 20 38 21 26 14 41 45 24 17 32 
          26-100  22 29 25 28 32 32 30 16 25 31 33 24 30 27 40 39 28 22 22 30 28 14 
          101-200  4  8  9  9 20  22  21 4  6 15  27 9 17 9 20  15  20 6  7 14  18 5 
          More  than  200  6  8  8  6 21  28  25 3  7 14  22  10  18 6 15  13  30 5  4 15  24 5 
Possess  a  computer  21 44 20 57 98 97 90 21 42 36 33 54 91 45 70 87 98 30 22 91 93 36 
Mother  born  in  country 94 94 91 96 86 89 76 98 91 99 90 87 94 85 96 85 78 94 99 98 86 92 
Father  born  in  country  92 94 89 97 85 88 74 97 93 99 88 86 95 87 96 84 78 92 99 98 85 90 
Student  born  in  country 90 92 88 95 93 92 86 97 76 98 91 91 95 89 97 96 89 92 99 98 91 67 
Parents' highest 
education                        
    University  16 24 38 11 23 68 29 18 28 20 44 26 48 20 39 25 49 19 10 17 57 10 
    Technical  post-second.  na 19 17 20 32 15 30 22 12 17 27 Na 26 68 na 31 17 na 12 11  9  13 
    Upper  Secondary  16 41 20 27 42 11 33 33 36 47 23 12 21  2  59 35 22 13 16 46 25 29 
    Lower  Secondary  16 11 15  24  na 4  5 13  18  10 6 18 5  9  1  8  9 30  17  21 6 19 
  No more than Primary  52  5  10  18  3  2  3  14  6  6  0  44  0  1  0  1  4  38  44  6  3  29 
C i t y   s i z e                         
   More than 500,000  3  13  20  10  4  8  18  13  7  16  24  33  8  9  3  3  9  12  2  25  13  11 
      100,001-500,000  2  5  4  16 25 16 19 15 13 24 19 10 13 16  9  12 22 10  3  36 12  8 
      50,001-100,000  10 19 na 17 22 10  9  25 21 10 11  5  12 13 14  1  14  7  13 18 14 11 
      15,001-50,000  24 17 16 26 43 34 18 16 18 15 15  9  23 30 29 13 26 23 44 18 30 24 
      3,001-15,000  39 37 38 30  5  29 24 17 32 14 15 15 39 22 23 40 24 44 38  3  22 34 
   Less than 3,000  22  9  21  2  na  3  12  15  9  21  17  27  5  10  22  30  5  4  na  0  9  12 
Computers in school  8  5 21  16  65  23  90  18 9 12  11 7  196  8  9 16  32 5  8 74  91 7 
Note : MAR = Morocco ; MKD = Macedonia ; MOL = Moldova ; MYS = Malaysia ; NLD = Netherlands ; NOR = Norway ; NZL = New Zealand ; PHL = Philippines ; PSE = 
Palestinian Nat. Auth. ; ROM = Romania ;  RUS = Russian Federation ; SAU = Saudi Arabia ; SCO = Scotland ; SER = Serbia ; SVK = Slovak Republic ; SLO = Slovenia ; SWE = 
Sweden ; SYR = Syrian Arab Republic ; TUN = Tunisia ; TWN = Taiwan ; USA = United States of America ; ZAF = South Africa. "na" mean "not applicable"  37
Appendix Table A3 : Analysis of grouping classes with same ability 
Country 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean Class Size 
(Standard Deviation) 
Percentage of classes 
grouped by ability  Sample (Number of Observations) 
Full sample Reduced  Math. Science Total  Full  Reduced
Australia 26.16  (4.66) 26.04  (3.97) 49.04 16.25 10224 7606  3633
Belgium (Flemish)  20.77 (4.15)  21.12 (3.84) 30.65 25.03 15228  12605  8211
England  27.30 (5.55)  26.83 (5.44) 61.32 54.28 7221  2975  708
Hong-Kong  39.59 (4.06)  39.96 (3.43) 34.66 11.94 9944  9629  5641
Italy  22.05 (3.65)  22.17 (3.74) 10.55 08.60 8598  8240  7112
Japan  35.57 (3.86)  35.69 (3.85) 11.87 01.33 9712  9678  8398
Korea  37.16 (5.26)  36.85 (4.52) 64.51 46.08 11237  6389  2047
Netherlands  26.01 (3.74)  26.13 (3.75) 18.08 10.83 7320  7320  5594
New Zealand  25.88 (4.90)  26.44 (4.81) 35.41 18.92 7626  6787  3964
Norway 26.03  (3.82)  n  n n 8266  7175  n
Scotland  24.08 (7.31)  24.21 (6.54) 74.48 10.65 7791  4494  681
Sweden  21.13 (7.19)  23.02 (5.79) 66.45 09.87 10338  5441  1835
Taiwan  37.24 (5.47)  37.32 (5.57) 15.41 11.09 10808  10579  8879
USA  24.76 (6.81)  24.94 (6.95) 53.85 14.41 17905  13923  5138
      
Bulgaria  23.15 (5.20)  22.96 (5.21) 43.30 39.80 15275  15275  7187
Cyprus  25.65 (4.17)  25.90 (4.31) 26.52 14.42 14842  11672  7517
Estonia  29.22 (6.92)  29.19 (7.07) 32.71 09.02 16437  15687  10470
Hungary  23.74 (5.56)  22.74 (5.51) 45.07 15.48 14814  14652  7348
Latvia  29.40 (12.29)  28.63 (11.77) 20.15 05.55 11016  11016  7834
Lithuania  26.39 (4.52)  26.62 (4.28) 39.77 31.40 20805  20805  10979
Macedonia  28.14 (5.19)  28.08 (5.10) 12.00 08.35 17612 17612 14957
Moldova  25.78 (6.48)  24.90 (6.39) 31.61 30.98 9401  7978  3364
Romania  25.06 (5.45)  25.47 (5.65) 36.82 33.75 18797  18797  10291
Russian Federation  24.40 (5.22)  24.82 (4.88) 42.95 31.79 23322  22461  12358
Serbia  26.66 (6.29)  26.42 (7.04) 32.74 33.87 18879  18711  11746
Slovakia  25.80 (5.08)  26.03 (5.16) 29.63 15.18 17162  1712  11788
Slovenia  22.05 (4.10)  22.86 (3.08) 30.14 10.68 13234  13102  7863
      
Armenia  31.79 (11.66)  32.94 (12.16) 19.39 18.93 19460  19460  12308
Bahrain  30.70 (5.16)  30.09 (5.74) 37.04 25.53 8398  8076  4570
Botswana  37.13 (4.84)  36.98 (4.89) 1.88 02.44 10300  9001  7868
Chile  35.46 (7.32)  36.12 (7.07) 16.77 15.65 13992  10806  8544
Egypt  37.40 (7.86)  37.42 (7.75) 31.19 27.65 14190  13760  9196
Ghana  38.36 (11.76)  38.24 (11.20) 19.00 17.98 10466  8213  6389
Indonesia  40.57 (5.92)  40.43 (5.74) 17.42 14.19 16707  15494  12354
Iran  29.70 (6.78)  29.61 (6.40) 61.29 70.32 9884  9656  2563
Jordan  26.37 (8.23)  36.58 (8.29) 9.03 11.43 8978  8795  7718
Lebanon  29.16 (7.90)  29.92 (7.85) 19.88 14.17 8895  8895  7086
Malaysia  37.10 (5.10)  36.46 (4.93) 45.87 39.94 10628  10500  5468
Morocco  42.04 (13.74)  43.39 (14.89) 13.83 31.41 2943  1184  833
Palestine  39.52 (8.63)  39.90 (8.37) 7.68 05.33 10714  10268  9084
Philippines  54.75 (10.81)  53.78 (10.72) 34.09 38.80 13834  13482  7981
Saudi Arabia  29.23 (8.46)  29.28 (8.50) 15.84 14.69 8590  7342  6051
South Africa  45.04 (14.68)  46.00 (15.17) 11.96 09.42 17949  12336  9250
Syrian A.R.  37.73 (9.42)  38.77 (9.16) 7.70 12.58 6102  4564  3612
Tunisia  34.09 (3.92)  33.73 (4.27) 44.63 45.43 9862  9034  4727
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 Appendix Table A4: Weighted Least Squares with Instrumental Variable technique (WLS-IV)  
Country (1)  (2)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 Linear  Form  Quadratic  Form 
  Coef.  t Stat  Coef.  t Stat  Coef.  t Stat  Turning 
point 
Australia -0.0139  (1.14)  0.5466*  (3.85)  -0.0107*  (3.64) 25.6 
Belgium (Fl.)  -0.1808†  (2.03) 4.9243 (1.25) -0.1266  (1.23)  
England  0.0293†  (2.42) -0.0224 (0.18) 0.0009  (0.44)   
Hong-Kong -0.0018  (0.12)  -0.6670*  (3.71)  0.0107*  (4.10) 31.3 
Italy -0.0017  (0.18)  -0.5788‡  (1.53)  0.0136‡  (1.56) 21.3 
Japan  -0.0826*  (6.38)  2.74149*  (2.89)  -0.0428*  (2.98) 32.0 
Korea  -0.0087 (0.55) 0.1337 (0.24) -0.0019  (0.25)   
Netherlands -0.0103  (0.65)  1.4972*  (3.71)  -0.0291*  (3.57) 25.7 
New Zealand  -0.0160‡  (1.55)  -4.5588‡  (1.67)  0.0885‡  (1.67) 25.8 
Norway  -0.0114 (1.16) -0.0108 (0.16) -0.0000  (0.01)   
Scotland  0.0384*  (3.40) 0.0346 (1.06) 0.0001  (0.17)  
Sweden  0.0107‡  (1.60) -0.0062 (0.25) 0.0004  (0.89)   
Taiwan  -0.0609*  (2.70)  -0.2858*  (3.68)  0.0041*  (3.94) 35.1 
USA  -0.0303*  (5.38)  -0.2256*  (5.32)  0.0042*  (5.32) 27.0 
           
Bulgaria  -0.0184*  (2.82) 0.2034 (0.66) -0.0047  (0.74)  
Cyprus  0.0041 (0.74) 0.1443 (1.20) -0.0032  (1.22)  
Estonia  0.0080†  (1.90) 0.0172 (1.59) -0.0002  (1.34)  
Hungary 0.0017  (0.25)  0.3738†  (1.97)  -0.0076†  (1.90) 24.7 
Latvia  0.0149*  (2.31)  0.0394†  (2.01)  -0.0004‡  (1.85) 49.2 
Lithuania  -0.0060 (0.76) -0.1048 (1.08) 0.0021  (1.10)   
Macedonia 0.0084  (0.85) -0.5428 (1.24) 0.0101  (1.23)  
Moldova  0.0215 (0.92) 0.1566 (0.57) -0.0025  (0.54)  
Romania  -0.0317*  (3.71)  -0.2492*  (3.26)  0.0047*  (3.17) 26.3 
Russian Fed.  -0.0083†  (2.09) -1.1316 (1.41) 0.0249  (1.40)   
Serbia  0.0066 (1.07) 0.0166 (0.97) -0.0002  (0.90)  
Slovakia  0.0085*  (2.37)  -0.3454‡  (1.67)  0.0073‡  (1.73) 23.8 
Slovenia  -0.0068 (0.61) 0.1703 (0.43) -0.0042  (0.44)   
           
Armenia  -0.0283†  (1.91) 0.1814 (1.30) -0.0025  (1.34)  
Bahrain  -0.0058 (0.56) 0.2730 (1.14) -0.0047  (1.22   
Botswana  -0.0374*  (2.76) -2.3064 (1.14) 0.0319  (1.13)   
Chile  -0.0217*  (6.27)  -0.5443*  (4.97)  0.0083*  (4.99) 32.8 
Egypt  -0.0175*  (3.23)  -0.1609*  (2.82)  0.0018*  (2.77) 45.0 
Ghana  0.0164 (1.40) 0.1712 (0.61) -0.0022  (0.58)  
Indonesia  -0.0463*  (3.25)  1.0878*  (3.17)  -0.0147*  (3.15) 37.1 
Iran  -0.0066 (1.41) -0.0667 (1.38) 0.0010  (1.37)   
Jordan  -0.0120*  (3.60) -0.0325 (0.91) 0.0003  (0.63)   
Lebanon  -0.0504*  (2.39) 13.444 (0.08) -0.2044  (0.08)  
Malaysia  -0.0564*  (5.87)  -1.1750*  (5.77)  0.0160*  (5.77) 36.7 
Morocco  -0.0253†  (2.53)  -0.1347†  (2.49)  0.0015†  (2.44) 45.6 
Palestine  -0.0236*  (4.15) -1.9402 (0.69) 0.0279  (0.69)   
Philippines  -0.0753*  (10.67)  -0.8113*  (5.74)  0.0072*  (5.73) 56.4 
Saudi Arabia  -0.0186‡  (1.81) -0.0559 (1.29) 0.0008  (1.13)   
South Africa  -0.0163*  (6.94)  -0.0727*  (4.82)  0.0006*  (4.42) 61.6 
Syrian A.R.  0.0109  (1.31)  0.1173†  (1.76)  -0.0016†  (1.81) 37.1 
Tunisia  0.0188 (0.52) -0.1003 (0.46) 0.0016  (0.47)  
Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): *1%. †5%. ‡10%. Dependent variable: achievement 
z-score. Controlling for student, school and family background variables. Numbers is parenthesis represents robust 
absolute t statistics. In order to simplify the presentation, coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or better are 
in bold. Instrument used for class-size is the teacher’s response to the question ‘to what extent does a high 
student/teacher ratio limit how you teach’?  First stage estimates are not reported but are available. 
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Appendix Table A5: Background data for FE and FE IV regressions 
Country 














in table 3 
Pupils 
in table 3 
Australia 198 414  48 1.14  (2.13) 26.16 (4.66) 6668  3334
Belgium (Flemish)  384 506  76 0.28 (1.00) 20.77 (4.15)  12095  4314
England 124 260  48 1.84  (3.05) 27.30  (5.55)  2080  1040
Hong-Kong 194 262  74 0.46  (1.47) 39.59  (4.06)  9314  4657
Italy(a) 432 432  100 0.00 (0.00)  
Japan
(a) 247 292  85 0.15  (0.53)  
Korea 160 298  54 0.76  (2.14) 37.16  (5.26)  4510  2255
Netherlands 179 309  58 0.44  (1.06) 26.13  (3.66)   
New Zealand 151 354  43 0.87  (1.55) 25.88  (4.90)  6142  3071
Norway
(a) 276 358  77 0.16  (0.81)  
Scotland 107 310  35 2.99  (3.56) 24.08  (7.31)  2982  1491
Sweden 164 328  50 2.19  (3.50) 21.13  (7.19)  4660  2330
Taiwan
(a) 296 300  99 0.00  (0.04)  
USA 332 914  36 2.28  (3.09) 24.76  (6.81)  11808  5904
      
Bulgaria 518 724  72 0.40  (1.49) 23.15  (5.20)  14374  3102
Cyprus 196 572  34 1.55  (2.56) 25.65  (4.17)  11598  3294
Estonia 429 604  71 0.62  (2.64) 29.22  (6.92)  15687  3855
Hungary 519 696  75 0.38  (1.58) 23.74  (5.56)  14626  3214
Latvia 225 531  42 3.67  (5.82) 29.40  (12.29)  10778  3318
Lithuania 625 1071  58 0.53  (1.70) 26.39  (4.52)  20765  4877
Macedonia 459 672  68 0.30  (0.86) 28.14 (5.19)  17580  3861
Moldova 234 398  59 1.18  (3.30) 25.78  (6.48)  7172  2961
Romania 533 812  66 0.43  (1.50) 25.06  (5.45)  18797  4104
Russian Federation
(a) 938 1068  88 0.05  (0.22)  
Serbia 617 772  80 0.57  (2.87) 26.66  (6.29)  18547  4072
Slovakia
(a) 604 715  84 0.17  (0.72)  
Slovenia 348 651  53 1.02  (2.10) 22.05  (4.10)  13080  3497
      
Armenia 206 856  24 4.85  (5.62) 31.79  (11.66)  19100  4992
Bahrain 130 294  44 0.62  (1.33) 30.70  (5.16)  7798  3899
Botswana
(a) 193 292  66 0.26  (0.56)  
Chile 310 390  79 0.19  (1.06) 35.46  (7.32)  10090  5045
Egypt 325 434  75 0.85  (2.10) 37.48  (7.84)   
Ghana
(a) 258 300  86 0.33  (1.38)  
Indonesia 
(a) 355 423  84 0.22  (1.22)  
Iran 283 362  78 0.62  (2.26) 29.56  (6.67)   
Jordan 201 280  72 0.37  (1.25) 36.39  (8.23)   
Lebanon 203 423  48 1.23  (2.76) 29.20  (7.88)   
Malaysia
(a) 232 300  77 0.21  (0.50)  
Morocco
(a) 128 150  85 1.84  (3.75)  
Palestine 209 290  72 0.94  (3.16) 39.43  (8.62)   
Philippines 205 274  75 0.73  (2.19) 54.82  (10.68)   
Saudi Arabia
(a) 281 344  82 0.37  (1.40)  
South Africa  302 510  59 2.08 (5.16) 45.79 (15.46)   
Syrian A.R.  210 268  78 0.81 (2.89) 38.45 (9.16)   
Tunisia 149 300  50 0.85  (1.61) 34.09  (3.92)   





   40
Appendix Table A6: First stage estimates for FE IV regression  
Country 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Linear Form  Quadratic Form 
Coef. t  Stat  Instrument 
statistic  Coef. t  Stat  Instrument 
statistic 
Australia 1.0039*  (58.66) 3440 0.0717‡ (1.74) 3 
Belgium (Fl.) 0.7605*  (31.49) 992 0.0552* (8.00) 64 
England 0.9435*  (15.79) 249 0.0702* (3.26) 11 
Hong-Kong 1.0008*  (30.37) 922 -0.0579* (4.04) 16 
Italy n   nn nnn  
Japan n  n n n n n 
Korea 1.0618*  (46.42) 2155 -0.0697* (2.62) 7 
Netherlands na na na na na na 
New Zealand 0.9985*  (25.77) 664 0.0582* (3.19) 10 
Norway n   nn nnn  
Scotland 1.0041*  (25.87) 669 0.1947* (7.88) 62 
Sweden 0.9770*  (62.32) 3883 0.3458* (15.17)  230 
T a i w a n  n   nn nnn  
USA 0.9824*  (121.9) >10000 0.1149* (8.22) 67 
    
Bulgaria 0.9945*  (468.9) >10000 0.6608* (24.37)  594 
Cyprus 0.9871*  (171.9) >10000 0.0793* (18.41)  339 
Estonia 0.9911*  (113.6) >10000 0.8470* (30.52)  931 
Hungary 0.9998*  (61.00) 3720 0.1253* (9.17) 84 
Latvia 0.9992*  (473.1) >10000 0.7827* (27.98)  783 
Lithuania 0.9804*  (45.83) 2101 0.0912* (5.11) 26 
Macedonia 0.9906*  (920.2) >10000 0.7493* (33.12) 1097 
Moldova 0.9910*  (572.8) >10000 0.8134* (51.62)  2665 
Romania 0.9258*  (21.19) 449 0.1712* (12.59)  159 
R u s s i a n  F e d .   n   nn nnn  
Serbia 0.9693*  (105.8) >10000 0.3573* (9.25) 86 
Slovakia n  n n n n n 
Slovenia 1.0000*  (164.5) >10000 0.6748* (23.16)  536 
    
Armenia 1.0048*  (357.2) >10000 0.1597* (28.45)  809 
Bahrain 0.9974*  (70.10) 4926 0.0156* (2.52) 6 
B o t s w a n a  n   nn nnn  
Chile 1.0000*  (25.53) 652 -0.2437* (3.27) 11 
Egypt na  na na na na na 
Ghana n  n n n n n 
Indonesia n  n n n n n 
Iran na  na na na na na 
Jordan na  na na na na na 
Lebanon na  na na na na na 
Malays i a  n   nn nnn  
Moro c c o  n   nn nnn  
Palestine na  na na na na na 
Philippines na  na na na na na 
Saudi Arabia  n  n n n n n 
South Africa  na  na na na na na 
Syrian A.R.  na  na na na na na 
Tunisia  na na na na na na 
 